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Chapter 1
Deleuze, Kant and the Transcendental 
Field
Daniel W. Smith
INTRODUCTION
The last article Deleuze published before his death in November of 
1995, entitled ‘Immanence: A Life . . .’, opens with the following ques-
tion: ‘What is a transcendental field?’.1 In a certain sense, this Kantian 
problem, which Deleuze here takes up at the end of his career, is the 
question that animated his work from the start. Deleuze’s first book, 
Empiricism and Subjectivity (1953), proposed a reading of Hume’s 
empiricism by making use of post-Kantian questions that, in them-
selves, were foreign to Hume’s own philosophy, but already pointed 
to the possibility of what Deleuze would later call a ‘transcendental 
empiricism’ (that is, a transcendental field freed from the constraints 
of a transcendental subject).2 Whereas Kant had asked, ‘How can the 
given be given to a subject?’, Hume had asked, ‘How is the subject 
(or what he called “human nature”) constituted within the given?’. 
Nietzsche and Philosophy, published nine years later (1962), though on 
the surface an anti-Hegelian tract, is more profoundly a confrontation 
with Kant that interprets Nietzsche’s entire philosophy as ‘a resump-
tion of [Kant’s] critical project on a new basis and with new concepts’. 
Its central chapter is entitled, precisely, ‘Critique’.3 The project of 
 1 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Immanence: A Life . . .’, in David Lapoujade (ed.), Two Regimes of 
Madness, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 
pp. 384–9.
 2 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human 
Nature, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
p. 87.
 3 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 52: ‘We believe that there is, in Nietzsche, not 
only a Kantian heritage, but a half-avowed, half-hidden rivalry . . . Nietzsche seems 
to have sought (and to have found in the “eternal return” and the “will to power”) 
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Anti-Oedipus (1972), which was, for a time at least, perhaps Deleuze 
and Guattari’s most famous work, is defined in explicitly Kantian and 
transcendental terms: just as Kant set out to discover criteria immanent 
to the syntheses of consciousness in order to denounce their illegitimate 
and transcendent employment in metaphysics, so Deleuze and Guattari 
set out to discover criteria immanent to the syntheses of the unconscious 
in order to denounce their illegitimate use in Oedipal psychoanalysis.4 In 
Deleuze’s magnum opus, Difference and Repetition (1968), the presence 
of Kant is almost ubiquitous, to the point where it can be read as both 
a completion and an inversion of the Critique of Pure Reason (just as 
Anti-Oedipus can be read as a completion and inversion of the Critique 
of Practical Reason).5 Even Deleuze’s 1981 book Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation can be seen as a reworking of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic.6
Deleuze’s philosophy, from this viewpoint, can be rightly interpreted 
as a transcendental philosophy, but one that defines the transcendental 
field in a completely different manner than does Kant: it is a problem-
atic, differential and virtual field populated with singularities and events, 
which constitutes a condition of real and not merely possible experience. 
In what follows, rather than trying to describe this transcendental field – 
which in effect would entail an elucidation of Deleuze’s entire  philosophy 
– I would simply like to make some fairly general observations on how 
this Kantian concern can serve as a guiding thread for interpreting the 
trajectory of Deleuze early writings. To be sure, this is only one of many 
approaches one can take on Deleuze’s work, which encompasses an 
a radical transformation of Kantianism, a re-invention of the critique which Kant 
betrayed at the same time as he conceived it, a resumption of the critical project on a 
new basis and with new concepts.’
 4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem 
and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 75: ‘In what he termed the criti-
cal revolution, Kant intended to discover criteria immanent to the understanding so 
as to distinguish the legitimate and the illegitimate uses of the syntheses of conscious-
ness. In the name of transcendental philosophy (immanence of criteria), he therefore 
denounced the transcendent use of syntheses such as appeared in metaphysics. In like 
fashion, we are compelled to say that psychoanalysis has its metaphysics – its name 
is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this time materialist – can proceed only by way 
of a critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the 
unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a transcendental 
unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria, and a corresponding practice we 
shall call schizoanalysis.’
 5 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994).
 6 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
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immense diversity and scope. But it has the advantage of allowing us to 
explore the strategies Deleuze used in his early work in the history of 
philosophy to marshal resources for his reconceptualisation of the tran-
scendental field. Historically, first, it explains why Deleuze wound up 
appealing to a ‘minor’ tradition of post-Kantian philosophy (Maimon, 
Nietzsche, Bergson) as opposed to what has come to be received as its 
‘major’ tradition (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel). Substantively, second, it 
will permit us to examine the way Deleuze modified Kant’s concept of 
the transcendental field in five crucial domains that defined the critical 
project: dialectics, aesthetics, analytics, ethics and politics. In each case, 
we will discover what it means to define the transcendental field with a 
method of genesis rather than a method of conditioning.
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Consider first the monographs Deleuze wrote in the history of philoso-
phy. In addition to his short study on Kant, Deleuze wrote books on 
Hume, Spinoza and Leibniz (pre-Kantians), as well as books on Bergson 
and Nietzsche (post-Kantians). The question we have to ask is: Why did 
Deleuze choose to write on these particular thinkers, and not others? 
The answer is given by Deleuze himself. It is often said that pre-Kantian 
philosophy found its principle in the notion of God (that is, the analytic 
identity of an infinite substance), whereas post-Kantianism found its 
principle in the notion of the Self (that is, the synthetic identity of the 
finite Self).7 Deleuze pointed out, however, that these God-Self permuta-
tions were of little interest to him, since it changes nothing in philoso-
phy to put Man in the place of God. Indeed, it was in Kant himself, in 
a ‘furtive moment’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, that Deleuze found 
the hint of the possibility of a transcendental field that would entail 
not only the death of God, but also the dissolution of the Self (what 
Foucault would later call the death of Man) as well as the destruction 
of the world – the Self, the World and God being the three great termi-
nal points of metaphysics.8 Indeed, if these are the three endpoints of 
metaphysics, it is because they are the three great forms of identity: the 
 7 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 58.
 8 Ibid.: ‘Rather than being concerned with what comes before and after Kant (which 
amounts to the same thing), we should be concerned with a precise moment within 
Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued by Kant, 
much less by post-Kantianism. For when Kant puts rational theology in question, in 
the same stroke he introduces a kind of disequilibrium . . . into the pure self of the “I 
think” . . . [that is] insurmountable in principle.’
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identity of the person as a well-founded agent, the identity of the world 
as its ambient environment, and the identity of God as the ultimate 
foundation – to which Deleuze might add the identity of bodies as the 
base of the person, and the identity of language as the capacity to denote 
everything else.9 One can sense two minor battles in these last two char-
acterisations: against the phenomenological notion of the ‘body image’ 
as the final avatar of the theological concept of the soul,10 and against 
the analytic preoccupation with the analysis of propositions and the 
theory of reference, which appears in Kant in the theory of judgement 
(one of Deleuze’s great themes is ‘to have done with judgement’, which 
above all means the form of judgement in propositions, and not merely 
moral judgement).
How then does Deleuze marshal the resources of the history of phi-
losophy to expand on this furtive moment in Kant (i.e., the idea of a 
transcendental field free from the coordinates of the Self, the World and 
God – that is, from the form of identity)? One of his chief influences here 
was the figure of Salomon Maimon, whose Essay on Transcendental 
Philosophy – which was published in 1790, one year before the appear-
ance of Kant’s third Critique – laid down the basic objections against 
Kant that would come to preoccupy the post-Kantian philosophies of 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel.11 Maimon’s basic objection was this: Kant 
 9 See Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester, with Charles Stivale, ed. 
Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 293, 294: 
‘The order of God includes the following elements: the identity of God as the ultimate 
foundation; the identity of the world as the ambient environment; the identity of the 
person as a well-founded agent; the identity of bodies as the base [as Deleuze says else-
where, the phenomenological concept of the “body image” is one of the final avatars 
of the old concept of the “soul”]; and finally the identity of language as the power of 
denoting everything else . . . The order of the Antichrist is opposed point by point to 
the divine order. It is characterised by the death of God, the destruction of the world, 
the dissolution of the person, the disintegration of bodies, and the shifting function of 
language, which now only expresses only intensities.’ Cf. p. 176: ‘The divergence of 
affirmed series form a “chaosmos” and no longer a world; the aleatory point which 
traverses them forms a counter-self, and no longer a self; disjunction posed as a synthe-
sis exchanges its theological principle for a diabolical principle . . . The Grand Canyon 
of the world, the “crack” of the self, and the dismembering of God.’
10 See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 23: ‘The “body image” – the final avatar 
of the soul, a vague conjoining of the requirements of spiritualism and positivism.’
11 Maimon’s now neglected work lies at the root of much post-Kantian philosophy; 
as Frederick Beiser notes, to study Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel without having read 
Maimon is like studying Kant without having read Hume; see Frederick Beiser, The 
Fate of Reason: German Philosophy From Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), p. 286. See also Jules Vuillemin, L’héritage kantien et la révo-
lution copernicienne (Paris: PUF, 1954), p. 55: In the criticism of scepticism, ‘what 
corresponds to the Kant-Hume relationship is now the Fichte-Maimon relationship’. 
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had ignored the demands of a genetic method. This criticism means two 
things.
First, Kant relied on what he himself called ‘facts’, for which he then 
searches for conditions. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does more 
than simply claim that reason implies a priori knowledge; he adds that 
the so-called ‘universal’ knowledges of pure sciences such as mathemat-
ics are the knowledges in which reason necessarily manifests itself. They 
are the a priori ‘facts’ of reason. In the Critique of Practical Reason, 
Kant similarly takes as his point of departure the ‘fact’ of the judge-
ment of value and moral action. Kant assumed these original facts of 
reason – the ‘fact’ of knowledge and the ‘fact’ of morality – and then 
sought their conditions of possibility in the transcendental. But this was 
a vicious circle that made the condition (the possible) refer to the con-
ditioned (the real) while reproducing its image. In other words, Kant’s 
conception of the transcendental entailed a conformism – the value of 
knowledge and morality are never placed in question. Maimon, by con-
trast, argued that Kant’s claim to ground his critique on reason alone 
would be valid only if these a priori knowledges had been deduced or 
engendered from reason as the necessary modes of its manifestation. In 
other words, the immanent ambitions of Kant’s critical project could 
be realised only if, rather than simply assuming these ‘facts’ as given, 
it provided a genetic account of knowledge and morality. Second, 
Maimon argued that this genetic demand could be fulfilled only through 
an account that described the transcendental conditions of real experi-
ence, and not merely those of possible experience. Even if the categories 
of the understanding are applicable to objects in general, the category 
itself can never specify which object it belongs to in real experience. By 
confining himself to possible experience, Kant was unable to provide 
the faculty of judgement a rule for determining when a given category 
was applicable to real experience. The concept of causality may indeed 
be applicable to certain irreversible causal sequences, as Kant argues 
in the Second Analogy (fire causes smoke, because fire always precedes 
Kant himself, in his letter to Marcus Herz of 26 May 1789, wrote of the Essay on 
Transcendental Philosophy: ‘But one glance at the work made me realize its excellence 
and that not only had none of my critics understood me and the main questions as 
well as Mr. Maimon does but also very few men possess so much acumen for such 
deep investigations as he.’ Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, ed. and 
trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 151. In a letter to 
Reinhold, Fichte wrote: ‘My respect for Maimon’s talent is limitless; I firmly believe, 
and am willing to prove, that the critical philosophy has been overturned by him.’ 
Fichte, Briefwechsel, III/2, p. 282, as quoted in Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 370, 
note 2.
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smoke in the order of time). But the concept itself gives us no means 
of distinguishing, within experience, between necessary and universal 
connections and contingent and constant conjunctions. Hume’s scepti-
cism, in other words, remains unanswered, and Kant’s duality between 
concept and intuition remains unbridgeable. Maimon, by contrast, was 
the first to argue that this duality could only be overcome through the 
formulation of a principle of difference. Whereas identity is the condi-
tion of possibility of thought in general, it is difference that constitutes 
the genetic condition of the real.
These two Maimonian themes – the demand for a genetic method and 
the positing of a principle of difference – reappear as leitmotifs in almost 
every one of Deleuze’s books through 1969, even if Maimon’s name is 
not always explicitly mentioned. The reason for this is not difficult to 
ascertain. The post-Kantian philosophers all took up Maimon’s chal-
lenge, but in some fashion each of them still subordinated the principle 
of difference to the principle of identity. Deleuze, I would argue, returns 
to Maimon in order to take up the one option that was not pursued as 
such by post-Kantian philosophy (though Schelling no doubt remains 
closest to Deleuze). For Deleuze, ‘difference-in-itself’ (the title of the 
first chapter of Difference and Repetition) becomes the genetic element 
of real experience, from which all other relations are derived (identity, 
analogy, resemblance, opposition, contradiction, negation, and so 
forth). Indeed, these two Maimonian themes will become two require-
ments of Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’, that is, a transcendental 
field without a transcendental subject or a thing-in-itself, both of which 
introduce elements of transcendence into the transcendental field. (It is 
important to recall that, for Kant, ‘transcendence’ and ‘transcendental’ 
are diametrically opposed terms: his transcendental philosophy was a 
method of immanence whose aim was to critique the transcendent illu-
sions of reason.) In Deleuze, there are no subjects, although there are 
processes of subjectivation; there are no objects, but there are processes 
of objectivation; there is no ‘pure reason’, but there are historically vari-
able processes of rationalisation, and so on. This is why Deleuze can say 
that the transcendental field is a principle of critique as well as a princi-
ple of creation.
The Pre-Kantian Tradition: Hume, Leibniz, Spinoza
It is not coincidental that Maimon described his own reformulation of 
transcendental philosophy as a ‘coalition system’ [Koalitionssystem] 
that incorporated various elements from the systems of Hume, Leibniz, 
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Spinoza. Nor is it coincidental that Deleuze devoted a separate mono-
graph to each of these thinkers. In this sense, Maimon functions as 
one of the primary philosophical precursors to Deleuze. At one level, 
Deleuze’s books on Hume, Leibniz and Spinoza, are simply brilliant 
monographs in the history of philosophy; but when Deleuze uses these 
pre-Kantian thinkers in his constructive works such as Difference and 
Repetition – when he treats them as contemporaries, as it were – he 
always asks the post-Kantian question: How would their systems 
function if they were freed from the metaphysical illusions of the 
Self, the World and God that were criticised by Kant in the Critique 
of Pure Reason? What would happen if one removed the theological 
exigency of a pre-established harmony from Leibniz’s philosophy? 
Or if one removed the identity of a single substance from Spinoza’s 
philosophy?12 This is how Deleuze transforms pre-Kantian thinkers 
into post-Kantian resources for his own thought, as way of reconfigur-
ing the transcendental field. (We have already seen how Deleuze saw in 
Hume’s philosophy an inversion of the Kantian question: ‘How is the 
subject constituted in the given?’ rather than ‘How is the given given to a 
subject?’)
Consider Leibniz’s philosophy, for instance, from this post-Kantian 
viewpoint. First, God would no longer be a Being who compares pos-
sible worlds and allows the ‘best’ of all possible worlds to pass into 
existence; rather, he would become a pure process that affirms incom-
possibilities and passes through them. Second, the World would no 
longer be a world of continuity defined by its pre-established harmony; 
instead, divergences, bifurcations and incompossibles would now be 
seen to belong to one and the same universe, a chaotic universe in which 
divergent series trace endlessly bifurcating paths, and give rise to violent 
discords and dissonances that are never resolved into a harmonic tonal-
ity: a ‘chaosmos’, as Deleuze puts it (borrowing a portmanteau word 
12 On these points, see the letter to Martin Joughin, cited in the ‘Translator’s Preface’ 
to Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone 
Books, 1990), p. 11: ‘What interested me most in Spinoza wasn’t his Substance, but 
the composition of finite modes. I consider this one of the most original aspects of my 
book. That is: the hope of making substance turn on finite modes, or at least of seeing 
in substance a plane of immanence in which finite modes operate, already appears in 
this book. What I needed was both (1) the expressive character of particular individu-
als, and (2) an immanence of Being. Leibniz, in a way, goes still further than Spinoza 
on the first point. But on the second, Spinoza stands alone. One finds it only in him. 
This is why I consider myself a Spinozist, rather than a Leibnizian, though I owe a lot 
to Leibniz.’ 
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from Joyce’s Finnegans Wake), and no longer a world.13 Leibniz could 
only save the ‘harmony’ of this world by relegating discordances and dis-
harmonies to other possible worlds. Third, individuals (the Self), rather 
than being closed upon the compossible and convergent world they 
express from within, would now be torn open, and kept open through 
the divergent series and incompossible ensembles that continually pull 
them outside themselves. The ‘monadic’ subject, as Deleuze puts it, 
becomes the ‘nomadic’ subject.14 The Leibnizian notion of closure is 
here replaced by the Deleuzian notion of capture.
One could say that Deleuze effects a similar type of conversion in his 
reading of Spinoza. For Deleuze, there can be neither a single substance 
nor essences (even singular essences), and thus, strictly speaking, no 
third kind of knowledge, since there is nothing to know at this level.15 
It is the first and second kinds of knowledge – affections/affects and 
concepts – that give us the most adequate access to Being. Although 
Deleuze likes to consider himself as Spinozist, that does not mean he 
accepts everything in Spinoza; far from it. The same holds for Bergson: 
even though Deleuze can rightly be considered a Bergsonian (as much 
as a Kantian, or a Leibnizian, or a Spinozist), Bergson’s first book, Time 
and Free Will, contains a sustained critique of the concept of intensity, 
which Deleuze explicitly rejects.16
13 The term ‘chaosmos’ can be found in James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (London: Penguin, 
1999 [1939]), p. 118: ‘every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle anyway 
connected with the gobblydumped turkery was moving and changing every part of the 
time’.
14 See Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 17: ‘Instead of a certain number of predicates being 
excluded from a thing in virtue of the identity of its concept, each “thing” is open 
to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, and at the same time it loses its 
center, that is to say, its identity as a concept and as a self’ (translation modified).
15 See Deleuze’s critique of Spinoza’s notion of substance in Difference and Repetition, 
pp. 40–1: ‘Nevertheless, [in Spinoza] there still remains a difference between substance 
and the modes: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while the 
modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than themselves. 
Substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the modes. Such a condition can 
be satisfied only at the price of a more general categorical reversal according to which 
being is said of becoming, identity of that which is different, the one of the multiple, 
etc. That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as 
a principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of 
a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own 
concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general 
already understood as identical.’
16 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 239: ‘This is why the Bergsonian critique of 
intensity seems unconvincing. It assumes qualities ready-made and extensities already 
constituted.’
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The Post-Kantian Tradition: Maimon, Nietzsche, Bergson
Deleuze’s strategy with regard to the post-Kantian tradition of Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel – which constitutes the history of the synthetic iden-
tity of the finite Self – is slightly different. Deleuze occasionally appeals 
to aspects of their thought that escapes this synthetic identity, such 
as Schelling’s theory of power.17 More importantly, though, Deleuze 
creates his own ‘minor’ tradition of post-Kantian philosophy which 
finds its shining points in Maimon, Bergson and Nietzsche, who made 
no appeal to the synthetic self.
In his book Bergsonism, Deleuze examines Bergson’s famous critique 
of the notion of the possible, which has certain parallels with Maimon’s 
critique. Bergson considers a number of metaphysical questions – ‘Why 
is there order rather than disorder?’ ‘Why is there something rather than 
nothing?’ ‘Why is there this rather than that?’ – and argues that these 
are false questions derived from a misplaced use of negation. Why? (1) 
What is given in experience is order, but we negate that order, and then 
speak of disorder, when we encounter an order we did not expect or do 
not understand (order + negation = disorder). (2) What is given in expe-
rience is being, but we negate that being, and then speak of non-being 
or ‘nothingness’, when a being does not correspond to our expectation 
and we experience it as a lack, or as the absence of what interests us 
(being + negation = non-being). (3) Finally, what is given in experience 
is the real, but we negate that real, and then speak of the possible, when 
we consider or desire that the real could have been otherwise (the real 
+ negation = the possible). In each of these cases, we fall into the same 
error: we mistake the more for the less, or an after for a before. We 
behave as though non-being existed before being, disorder before order, 
and the possible before existence – as though being came to fill in a void, 
order to organise a preceding disorder, the real to realise a pre-existing 
possibility. As Deleuze writes: ‘Being, order, and the existent are truth 
itself; but in the false problem there is a fundamental illusion, a “retro-
grade movement of the true”, in which being, order, and the existent 
project themselves back into a possibility, a disorder, a nonbeing that 
are supposed to be primordial.’18
One can see the parallels with Maimon’s critique of Kant: for 
17 See, e.g., Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 190–1.
18 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (New York: Zone Books, 1988), p. 18, quoting from 
Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. 
Andison (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co, 1975), p. 118.
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Bergson, the possible is a false notion, a source of false problems. When 
we think of the possible as somehow ‘preexisting’ the real, we think of 
the real as something more than possible, that is, as the possible with 
existence added to it. We then say that the possible has been ‘realised’ in 
the real. This process of realisation, Deleuze suggests, is subject to two 
rules: resemblance and limitation. The real is supposed to resemble or to 
be ‘in the image of’ the possible that it realises: the concept of the thing 
is already given as possible, and simply has existence or reality added 
to it when it is realised. On the other hand, since not every possible is 
realised, the process of realisation involves a limitation by which some 
possibles are supposed to be repulsed or thwarted, while others pass into 
the real. But this is where the slight of hand becomes obvious: if the real 
is supposed to resemble the possible, is it not because we have retrospec-
tively or retroactively ‘projected’ a fictitious image of the real back into 
the possible? In fact, it is not the real that resembles the possible, it is the 
possible that resembles the real. As Deleuze would later write in Logic of 
Sense, ‘the error of all determinations of the transcendental as conscious-
ness is to conceive of the transcendental in the image and resemblance 
of what it is supposed to found’.19 One can see why Deleuze, following 
Bergson, would reject the notion of ‘conditions of possibility’, and will 
replace the possible-real opposition with the virtual-actual couplet: 
every phenomenon is an actualisation of virtual elements, relations and 
singularities that are themselves real.20
Nietzsche and Philosophy, in turn, is animated by similar Kantian 
concerns, though we will not explore them in detail here. In general, 
Deleuze argues that it is Nietzsche who finally fulfilled Kant’s transcen-
dental project by bringing the critique to bear, not on false claims to 
knowledge and morality, as in Kant, but on knowledge and morality 
themselves, on true knowledge and true morality – and indeed on the 
very notion of truth itself. Deleuze interprets the will to power and 
eternal return as genetic principles that give a genealogical account of 
the meaning and value of knowledge, morality and truth.21
In these early works, Deleuze explicitly sets out a certain number of 
criteria for thinking about the status of the transcendental field. First, 
the condition must be a condition of real experience, and not merely 
of possible experience: ‘it forms an intrinsic genesis, not an extrinsic 
19 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 105.
20 Deleuze, Bergsonism, pp. 94–103; Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 208–14.
21 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 51–2, 93–4.
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conditioning’.22 Second, this means that the condition cannot be in the 
image of the conditioned, that is, the structures of the transcendental 
field cannot simply be traced off the empirical. Third, to be a condition 
of real experience, the condition can be no broader than what it condi-
tions; the condition must therefore be determined along with what it 
conditions, and must change as the conditioned changes (conditions are 
not universal but singular). Fourth, to remain faithful to these exigen-
cies, ‘we must have something unconditioned’ that would be capable 
of ‘determining both the condition and the conditioned’.23 This is the 
crux of Deleuze’s debate with Hegel: Is this unconditioned the ‘total-
ity’ (Hegel) or the ‘differential’ (Deleuze)? Is it external difference (the 
‘not-X’ of Hegel) or internal difference (the dx of Deleuze)? Fifth, the 
nature of the ‘genesis’ in the genetic method must therefore be under-
stood, not as a dynamic genesis – that is, as a historical or developmental 
genesis – but rather as a static genesis (i.e., a genesis that moves from the 
virtual to its actualisation).
Deleuze’s work in the history of philosophy, it seems to me, was 
organised, in a rather conscious manner, around this aim of rethink-
ing the nature of the transcendental field. When Deleuze claims that 
the limitations of the Kantian theory can only be overcome through a 
theory of singularities, it is because singularities (or events) escape the 
system of the Self, the World and God. As Deleuze constantly says, they 
are ‘impersonal’ [escaping the form of the Self], pre-individual’ [escap-
ing the form of God] and ‘a-cosmic’ [escaping the form of the World]’.24 
It would not be difficult, I think, to show that Deleuze’s use of prior 
figures in the history of philosophy – such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, 
Lucretius, Duns Scotus – are also put in the service of this transcendental 
project, and it is this overriding concern that bestows that particularly 
‘Deleuzian’ tone to his monographs.
KANT AND DELEUZE’S CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY
This Kantian theme becomes even more revealing when one turns from 
Deleuze’s work in the history of philosophy to his elaboration of his 
own philosophical system. I use the term ‘system’ advisedly. ‘I feel that 
I am a very classical philosopher’, Deleuze once wrote. ‘I believe in 
philosophy as a system . . . [But] for me, the system must not only be in 
22 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 154.
23 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, pp. 122–3.
24 Ibid. p. 177.
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perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a heterogenesis, something which, 
it seems to me, has never before been attempted.’25 Heterogenesis: this 
means, following Maimon, that the system must be a genetic system that 
accounts for the genesis of the heterogeneous, the creation of difference, 
the production of the new. Our second question then becomes: What 
would Deleuze’s ‘system’ look like if one attempted to describe it in 
Kantian terms? I would like to briefly take a stab at this here, using five 
Kantian rubrics that roughly parallel the architectonic of Kant’s own 
system: Dialectics, Aesthetics, Analytics, Ethics and Politics.
a. Dialectics (Theory of Ideas). Consider first Deleuze’s conception 
of Dialectics, that is, his theory of Ideas (what can only be thought). 
Deleuze’s philosophy is far too quickly identified as an ‘anti-dialectical’ 
mode of thought. It is true that Deleuze is anti-Hegelian: what he criti-
cises in the Hegelian dialectic is its reliance on the mechanisms of con-
tradiction and ‘the labour of the negative’, which Deleuze replaces with 
movements of difference and the joy of affirmation. It is also true that he 
is anti-Platonic, at least insofar as Plato defined Ideas in terms of their 
self-identity and their transcendence; for Deleuze, Ideas are immanent 
and differential.
But Deleuze develops his own theory of Ideas primarily by reconsider-
ing Kant’s Dialectics. If Kant critiqued the concept of the world, it was 
because the true object of that Idea is the category of causality, and the 
causal nexus that extends infinitely in all directions, and can never be 
unified. When we believe we can unify this causal nexus and assign an 
object to it – we can call it the World, or the Universe, or the totality 
of what is –, we are then in a transcendent illusion. The true object of 
that idea, its immanent object, is the category of causality itself, the 
extension of which we experience as a problem. This is the aspect of 
Kant that Deleuze takes up: Ideas are objectively problematic structures. 
Deleuze’s claim that he is a pure metaphysician amounts to saying that 
Being – ultimate reality – is a problem: it always presents itself to us 
under a problematic form (we experience the world, and everything in 
the world, initially in the form of a problem – something we do not rec-
ognise, but rather something that forces us to think).
In a way, Deleuze here takes up and develops a theme first proposed 
25 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Lettre-préface de Gilles Deleuze’, in Jean-Clet Martin, Variations: La 
Philosophie de Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Payot, 1993), p. 7. See also Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 9: ‘Today it is said that systems are bankrupt, but it is only 
the concept of the system that has changed.’
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in Heidegger’s book, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.26 For 
Heidegger, the great problem in Kant was the relation between thought 
and being – that is, the relation between concepts and intuitions. Kant 
himself effected a mediation between the two via the operations of 
synthesis and schematisation, which are operations of the productive 
imagination. But in the third Critique (written after Maimon’s Essay), 
Kant showed (against Heidegger) that the secret of the Kantian project 
does not lie in the imagination, but in the theory of Ideas: when synthe-
sis breaks down it produces the experience of the sublime, and when 
schematising breaks down, it produces the operation of symbolising. 
Now both the sublime and the symbol (along with genius and teleology) 
are means through which Ideas appear in Nature itself, in the sensible. 
This is what it means to say that Deleuze’s theory of Ideas is purely 
immanent: Ideas are problematic ontological structures that are imma-
nent to experience as such. They do not simply exist in our heads, but 
are encountered here and there in the constitution of the actual world. 
The history of humanity, as well as the history of nature (or rather, its 
‘becoming’), can be conceived of as a history of problematisations – a 
notion Foucault would later adopt from Deleuze.27
However, when it comes to fleshing out the exact nature of these 
problematic structures (or Ideas), Deleuze turns not to Kant, but to 
Leibniz. Many of the concepts he uses to characterise the nature of prob-
lems can be found in Leibniz: problematic structures are multiplicities, 
constituted by singularities (or events), which are themselves defined 
in terms of the differential relation between indeterminate and purely 
virtual elements, and so forth. As Deleuze once commented in a seminar: 
‘All the elements to create a genesis as demanded by the post-Kantians 
are virtually present in Leibniz.’28
One can already sense here the revolution Deleuze is in the process 
of introducing into the history of philosophy. If Deleuze can consider 
himself a metaphysician, and rejects the Heideggerian theme of the end 
of metaphysics, it is because be believes – naively, as he puts it – that 
it is possible to construct a new metaphysics that replaces the old one 
(where the Self, the World and God were the highest forms of identity): 
the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, singularities or 
26 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
27 See, for instance, Michel Foucault, ‘Polemics, Politics and Problematizations’, Essential 
Works of Foucault, ed. Paul Rabinow, vol. 1, Ethics (New York: The New Press, 
1998).
28 Deleuze, seminar of 20 May 1980, available online at <www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze>.
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events replace the notion of essence, and so forth. If the theory of Ideas 
is a response to the Socratic question ‘What is. . .?’, one could say that, 
for Deleuze, anything that is is a multiplicity (and not a substance), con-
stituted by a convergence of singularities (and not by an essence), which 
are virtualities (and not possibilities), and so on. The aim of Deleuze’s 
theory of Ideas, in other words, is to provide us with a means of thinking 
the nature of being, even if he would later call into question the concept 
of ontology by suggesting that the term ‘est’ (is) should be replaced with 
the word ‘et’ (and).
b. Aesthetics (Theory of Sensation: Space and Time). We turn now, 
second, to the question of aesthetics. If the question of sensibility plays 
an important role in Deleuze’s work, it is because in themselves such 
problematic structures are primarily sensed rather than apprehended: 
they affect us, and provoke us to think. This is why Deleuze calls them 
problematic multiplicities, as opposed to theorematic structures that 
begin with well-defined axioms. Kant himself had separated the theory 
of sensation (aesthetics) into two isolated parts. In the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetic’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, aesthetics designated the 
theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience: this was the 
objective element of sensation as conditioned by the a priori forms of 
space and time. In the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’ in the Critique 
of Judgment, which includes the Analytics of the Beautiful and the 
Sublime, aesthetics designated the theory of art as a reflection upon real 
experience: this was the subjective element of sensation as incarnated in 
the feeling of pleasure and pain.
For Deleuze, by contrast, space, time and sensation are themselves 
differential Ideas. He locates the conditions of sensibility in an inten-
sive conception of space and a non-chronological conception of time, 
which are actualised in a plurality of extended spaces, and a complex 
rhythm of actual times, which is the object of Deleuze’s analyses in the 
‘Repetition’ chapter of Difference and Repetition. Moreover, since for 
Deleuze the aim of art is to produce a sensation, these genetic principles 
of sensation are also the principles of composition of the work of art, 
and conversely, it is the structure of the work of art that reveals these 
conditions. Deleuze’s theory of sensation in this way reunites the two 
halves of aesthetics dissociated by Kant: the theory of forms of experi-
ence (as the ‘being of the sensible’) and the work of art (as a ‘pure being 
of sensation’).
One of Deleuze’s most important works in this regard is his two-
volume study of the cinema. Whatever their importance for film studies, 
The Movement-Image and The Time-Image are essentially an elabora-
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tion of Deleuze’s Transcendental Aesthetic. One of the characteristics of 
film is that it presented a new type of image: an image that moves, and 
that moves in time. The philosophical question Deleuze poses in these 
works is: ‘What exactly does the cinema show us about space and time 
that the other arts do not show?’29 He presents the work as a classifica-
tion of the multiplicity spaces and times actualised in modern cinema. 
In his book on Proust, he likewise examines the various structures of 
time revealed in In Search of Lost Time. If one of the characteristics of 
modern art was to have renounced the domain of representation and 
instead to have taken the conditions of representation as its object, 
Deleuze’s numerous writings on the arts are in effect explorations of 
this transcendental domain of sensibility: the subtitle of his study of the 
painter Francis Bacon is ‘the logic of sensation’.
c. Analytics (Theory of the Concept). Consider now the third divi-
sion of Kant’s first Critique, the Analytic of Concepts. Deleuze agrees 
with Kant that philosophy can be defined as ‘knowledge through pure 
concepts’, but he takes the further step, against Kant, that concepts can 
never be given ready-made or a priori. Rather, concepts must always 
be created, invented, or fabricated (which is why Deleuze considered 
himself to be an empiricist), and they are always created in response to 
a specific problem.30 One can note the deduction of these domains in 
Deleuze: (1) being (reality) presents itself under the form of a problem 
(Dialectics); (2) these problematics (differential multiplicities) are not 
known by us, they are primarily sensed, and these sensed intensities 
provoke us to think (Aesthetics); (3) one of the outcomes of this thought 
process (though by no means the only one) is the creation of concepts 
(Analytics).
In Difference and Repetition, however, Deleuze is highly critical of 
concepts, but primarily insofar as they are subordinate to the model of 
judgement, which consists of subsuming the particular under the general 
– whether these are the genus and species of Aristotle, or the Kantian 
categories. ‘Every philosophy of categories’, writes Deleuze, ‘takes judg-
ment as its model’.31 Judgement has two functions: common sense and 
good sense. Common sense is a faculty of identification that can be 
29 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), p. 58.
30 See Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 7: ‘The following definition of phi-
losophy can be taken as being decisive: knowledge through pure concepts.’ This phrase 
is qualified by the more famous line: ‘philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and 
fabricating concepts’ (p. 2).
31 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 33.
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defined in terms of both the subjective identity of the self and its facul-
ties, and the objective identity of the things to which these faculties refer. 
Since we no more find ourselves before a universal indeterminate object 
than we are a universal self, however, judgement requires a second 
faculty of good sense (the French sens here meaning ‘direction’), which 
subsumes diversity under the common form of the Same, reducing the 
more differentiated to the less differentiated, the singular to the regular, 
ultimately equalising difference by relating it to the form of an object or 
the identity of a subject. This is the orientation that one finds in Kant’s 
Table of Categories, which are derived from the various forms of judge-
ment: the categories provide an a priori direction that everyone must 
follow, and they are distributed in an a priori manner that everyone 
must share. The type of distribution offered in the Table of Categories, 
as Kant himself noted, is inseparable from the agrarian problem: it 
implies the establishment of enclosures, the delimitation of territories, 
the assignation of ‘property’ and the instituting of ‘classes’.
It was not until What is Philosophy?, published in 1991, that Deleuze 
put forward his own analytic of concepts, for which his motto, one 
might say, was ‘to have done with judgement’ (even reflective judge-
ment). The sedentary distribution of categories found in Kant (and 
Aristotle) is imposed upon a prior nomadic and problematic distribution 
of elements, relations and singularities (multiplicities) that Deleuze has 
analysed in his Dialectics. (Like Kant, Deleuze distinguishes Ideas from 
concepts, albeit in an original manner.) This is the import of Deleuze’s 
doctrine of univocity, derived, in modified form, from Duns Scotus: 
Being speaks in one voice, but what it speaks is difference-in-itself (or 
problematics). Categories, whether Kantian or Aristotelian, can only 
have an analogical relation to Being, never a univocal relation – which 
is why a philosophy such as Deleuze’s can never have categories (unless, 
like Peirce, for example, one creates a new concept of a ‘category’). 
The basis for Deleuze’s Analytics thus lies in his Dialectics: a concept, 
Deleuze tells us, is a heterogenesis:32 it actualises a certain number of 
singularities and renders them consistent within itself. In this sense, 
concepts do not have a referent, since their object is created at the same 
time the concept is created. Deleuze thus distinguishes concepts from the 
‘functions’ of science and logic, which – although they are equally crea-
tive – are necessarily referential, and are developed in discursive systems.
The earliest, and perhaps still the most concrete, example of Deleuze’s 
approach to concepts can already be found in his 1967 study of 
32 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 20.
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Masochism.33 It criticises the Hegelian presumptions (of complemen-
tarity and opposition) implied in the notion of ‘sado-masochism’, and 
instead presents a differential analysis of the component elements of the 
concepts ‘sadism’ and ‘masochism’, showing that each of these concepts 
define incommensurate objects, separate universes between which there 
is no communication.
d. Ethics (Theory of Affectivity). Fourth, what is Deleuze’s relation 
to the second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason. Deleuze often 
uses the term ‘morality’ to define, in very general terms, any set of ‘con-
straining’ rules (e.g. a moral code) that consists in judging actions and 
intentions by relating them to transcendent values (this is good, that is 
evil. . .). It is this Kantian model of judgement and the appeal to univer-
sals that Deleuze rejects. What he calls ‘ethics’ is, on the contrary, a set 
of ‘facultative’ rules that evaluate what we do, say, or think according 
to the immanent mode of existence that it implies. One says or does 
this, thinks or feels that: what mode of existence does it imply? As both 
Spinoza and Nietzsche showed, modes of existence are defined inten-
sively as a degree of power, a capacity for affecting or being affected 
that is necessarily actualised at every moment. Each in their own way 
showed that there are certain things one cannot do or even think except 
on the condition of being weak, base, or enslaved, unless one harbours 
a vengeance or ressentiment against life (Nietzsche), unless one remains 
the slave of passive affections (Spinoza); and there are other things one 
cannot do or say or feel except on the condition of being strong, noble, 
or free, unless one affirms life or attains active affections.
Moreover, one would have to argue that the concept of desire that lies 
at the basis of Deleuze’s ethico-political philosophy – notably in Anti-
Oedipus – is an explicit attempt to rework the fundamental theses of 
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Kant presents the second Critique 
as a theory of desire, and he defines desire, somewhat surprisingly, in 
causal terms: desire is ‘a faculty which by means of its representations is 
the cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations’. In its 
lower form, the products of desire are fantasies and superstitions; but 
in its higher form (the will), the products of desire are acts of freedom 
under the moral law – actions which are, however, irreducible to mecha-
nistic causality. Deleuze takes up and modifies Kant in two fundamental 
ways. First, if desire is productive or causal, then its product is itself 
real (and not illusory or noumenal): the entire socio-political field, 
33 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, trans. Jean McNeil (New York: 
Zone Books, 1989).
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Deleuze argues, must be seen as the historically determined product of 
desire. Second, to maintain this claim, Deleuze appeals to the theory 
of Ideas outlined above. In Kant, the postulates of practical reason are 
found in the transcendent Ideas of God, World, and the Soul, which are 
themselves derived from the types of judgement of relation (categorical, 
hypothetical, disjunctive). For Deleuze, by contrast, desire is determined 
by a set of constituting passive syntheses (connective, disjunctive, con-
junctive), which in turn appeals to Deleuze’s genetic and differential 
theory of Ideas. In this sense, what one finds in Deleuze is at once an 
inversion as well as a completion of Kant’s critical philosophy.
e. Politics (Social Theory). Consider, finally – and very briefly – the 
question of politics, which is developed primarily in the works Deleuze 
co-authored with Félix Guattari. The link between ethics and politics 
is, for Deleuze, redefined as the link between desire and power: desire 
(the difference between active and reactive forces in a given mode of 
existence) never exists in a spontaneous or natural state, but is always 
‘assembled’ [agencé] in variable but determinable manners in concrete 
social formations, and what assembles desire are relations of power. 
Deleuze remains ‘Marxist’ in that his social theory is necessarily tied to 
an analysis of capitalism, which he defines by the conjunction or dif-
ferential relation between the virtual quantities of labour and capital. 
What he calls ‘schizophrenia’ is an absolute limit that would cause these 
quantities to travel in a free and unbound state on a desocialised body: 
this is the ‘Idea’ of society, a limit that is never reached as such, but 
constitutes the ideal ‘problematic’ to which every social formation con-
stitutes a concrete solution. For Deleuze, the central political question 
concerns the means by which the singularities and states of difference of 
the transcendental field are assembled in a given socius. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia consequently outlines a typology of four abstract social 
formations – ‘primitive’ or segmentary societies, States, nomadic ‘war 
machines’ and capitalism itself – that aims to provide the conceptual 
tools for analysing the diverse dimensions of concrete social structures: 
How are its mechanisms of power organised? What are the ‘lines of 
flight’ that escape its integration? What new modes of existence does 
it make possible? These types of social formations are not to be under-
stood as stages in a progressive evolution or development; rather, they 
sketch out a topological field in which each type functions as a variable 
of coexistence that enters into complex relations with the other types.
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CONCLUSION
These, to be sure, are only very general schematic characterisations of 
the structure of Deleuze’s project. The conclusions I would like to draw 
from them are modest: first, that in both his historical and constructive 
work, Deleuze was pursuing the elaboration of a philosophical system 
(one that is open, differential, problematic, and so on); and second, that 
this system is a transcendental system, one that both completes and 
inverts Kant’s critical project. Historically, in working out this tran-
scendental project, Deleuze primarily made use of three pre-Kantian 
thinkers (Hume, Spinoza and Leibniz) and three post-Kantian thinkers 
(Maimon, Nietzsche and Bergson) – all of whom provide Deleuze with 
the resources to think through a metaphysics stripped of the presup-
positions of both God and Man, infinite substance and finite subject. 
Constructively, I have tried to sketch out the implications of Deleuze’s 
project in five Kantian domains – dialectics, aesthetics, analytics, ethics 
and politics – showing how, in each case, Deleuze introduces into his 
analyses a consideration of the role of heterogenesis. Finally, I might 
note that Deleuze himself summarises his distance from Kant in terms 
of two fundamental inversions: the repudiation of universals in favour 
of the singular, and the repudiation of the eternal in favour of the new, 
that is, the genetic conditions under which something new is produced 
(heterogenesis).34 These are perhaps the two essential themes that mark 
Deleuze’s reconceptualisation of the transcendental field towards a 
‘transcendental empiricism’.
34 Deleuze frequently makes both these points; see, for instance, the conclusion of ‘What 
is a dispositif?’ in Michel Foucault: Philosopher, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 159–68.
